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Abstract 
The global drug problem has been identified as one of the greatest threats to society. The 
problem is however diagnosed distinctively and the measures to counter it are thus disagreed 
upon. In this project the ways in which respectively UN agencies and civil society networks have 
framed the problem are analyzed. Main documents of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime are scrutinized and contrasted to the International Drug Policy Consortium’s main 
advocacy paper. Constructivist theories about international organizations are used to understand 
how the self-identity of the UN determines its interests and behavior, and how it influences 
policies by the power of its ideas and expertise. Theories of transnational advocacy networks 
explain how these make use of complex techniques of pressuring to gain influence on the 
interests and moral ideas of the UN as well as its member states. On the basis of the key 
documents and the chosen theories, it is argued that the drug issue is framed in ways that 
legitimize the authority of each actor and broadens the spectrum of their influence. Their 
interests and behaviors are thus determined by their ideas and self-identities.  
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Introduction  
The impact and significance of globalization has been debated intensely. Few scholars would 
however deny the changes to world politics following the radical technological developments 
and communications revolutions of the 20th century. Not only did states grow interdependent 
economically, also environmental, political and cultural events from one part of the world would 
increasingly manifest themselves in others (Heywood, 2014). Globalization thus contributed to 
blur national boundaries, since communications, cultures, issues and ideas would flow 
increasingly across these. This opened up for state cooperation on a number of issues and a rapid 
proliferation of international organizations (IOs) followed (ibid.). IOs were created by states to 
deal with complex issues that they could not handle themselves. Furthermore important threats 
would gain transnational character and states saw themselves forced to cooperate with non-state 
and private actors to broaden interventions beyond nation territory (Mathews, 1997). The degree 
to which these changes have led states’ to lose sovereignty is contested, but both IOs as well as 
private and nongovernmental actors seem to influence international and domestic matters 
increasingly. One of the significant threats on which states have been forced to cooperate is the 
global drug problem (ibid.). 
Problem Area 
In the 17th and 18th century drugs comprised an important commodity on the global marketplace, 
together with other psychoactive commodities such as coffee, alcohol and tobacco. Opium grew 
particularly popular in China and western nations took active part in the production and trade of 
what was regarded a lucrative commodity (McAllister, 2000). The widespread opium abuse led 
the Chinese government to implement regulations on the trade. Rapid technological and 
scientific developments of the 19th century broadened the range of euphoriant substances and 
facilitated the wide distribution of these. The widespread drug trade and abuse became gradually 
more of a concern for nation-states and in 1907 Britain, China and India signed a ten-year 
agreement to end opium exports to China. This is where the international efforts to drug control 
began and within the next few years there would be several international meetings to end the 
East Asian opium traffic (ibid.). In 1912 states agreed on the first Opium Convention, which 
marked the beginning of the international drug control system. The convention was later adopted 
by the League of Nations that would provide for a true venue for international interaction 
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(McAllister, 2000). In the following years, industrialized states would work on establishing an 
effective system based on supply control and several treaties came into force (Collins, 2012). 
The negotiations of an international supply control arrangement were however interrupted by 
WWII and by the end of this, the United Nations (UN) became the new custodian for the 
administration of drug related treaties. 
Even though UN drug control system was a multilateral construct, its shape and operation was 
dominated by the American prohibitionist norm (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). Geopolitical changes at 
the end of the Cold War and the exacerbation of drug related issues however led to a significant 
number of member states questioning this norm. In 1998 the UN General Assembly convened its 
first Special Session on drugs, in which the international community committed itself to 
eradicating illicit drug use and supply within ten years. In the next decade the drug control 
regime would undergo changes from within, as some countries began favoring a harm-reducing 
approach, thus clashing with prohibitionist-oriented states (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). Several states 
would experiment with alternative domestic drug policies and deviated from the prohibitionist 
norm while complying with the legal boundaries of UN drug treaties (Ibid.). This has led to 
heated debates and tensions during negotiations. The disagreements opened up for new ideas in 
the policy debate and civil society networks began to pressure for influencing these. History 
shows how individuals and movements have influenced the drug control system and how this has 
been constructed socially (McAllister, 2012). The aim with this project is thus, to understand the 
ways in which different actors have framed the global drug issue as a field for them to operate as 
important players. 
Problem formulation 
How do respectively the UNODC and transnational civil society networks frame the 
international drug issue and how does this contribute to constructing them as actors?  
Working questions 
● How does the UNODC frame the international drug issue as a way of reinforcing its 
legitimacy as an actor? 
● How do transnational civil society networks seek to influence the drug control system 
through persuasion and pressure? 
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Methods 
Qualitative Research 
The investigation seeks to explain the processes through which IOs and civil society actors 
engage themselves in debating international drug policies. The project utilizes a qualitative 
research method, as it enables scrutiny of values, identities and behavior of the actors, subjected 
to the analysis. This method facilitates the understanding of relationships between actors (Nack 
& Woodsong, 2005). 
 
In the analysis of the UN drug agencies’ framing of the global drug issue, the UNODC was 
chosen as the subject of analysis. Even though the UN drug system consists of several bodies, the 
UNODC functions as the ‘public face’ and the operating, rather than monitoring, body of the 
system. The Political Declaration and Plan of Action of 2009 was picked out for the analysis, as 
it represents the multilateral efforts, facilitated by the UN drug agencies, aimed at countering the 
world drug problem. It evaluates the progress made towards the common goals established at the 
first UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs in 1998. It thus identities future 
priorities and goals towards the second UNGASS on drugs to be convened in 2016. The second 
part of the analysis, in which civil society’s framing of the issue is covered, The International 
Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), a global network of 129 NGOs from all regions of the world, 
was singled out. This network was specifically selected due to its wide membership and 
engagement in the drug policy debate. Their Drug Policy Guide is the main object of analysis, as 
it is the IDPC’s keynote publication and one of its main advocacy tools.  
 
Theoretical approach 
The constructivist approach perceives the social and political world to be coherent and not 
separate phenomena (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013). Central to constructivism is the belief that 
human experience of the world and social phenomena is socially constructed (Hacking, 1999:6).  
The ontological position of constructivism therefore emphasize that science cannot reach one 
objective explanation of reality. Thus, social reality does not exist outside the relationships that 
constitute it. Social phenomena will always be experienced through a lense of social forces, 
ideology and values. Constructivism favors interpretation of historical and social events that 
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become intersubjective through social interaction. Through this process, knowledge, significance 
and meaning become intersubjectively shared truths. Meaning is therefore assigned and not 
natural nor universal. They however do have consequences for social meaning, action and power. 
These are determined through social agreements, which evolve dynamically across time and 
space. Language, discourse and interactions are crucial in order to study how reality is 
constructed (Hacking, 1999).  
The social constructivist approach contributes to establish a transformative perspective of how 
the UNODC and global civil society networks can influence the drug policy debate. Moreover it 
highlights the ways in which truth is viewed and how reality is understood through human 
interactions. This means that reality is constructed by actors’ knowledge and practices (Fuglsang 
& Olsen, 2004).  
 
Theory 
In this section, the chosen theories will be outlined with their basic assumptions about different 
actors’ behavior in international policy-making. These theories explain how ideas shape the 
interests and behaviors of actors internationally. This gives an understanding of how 
intersubjective identities are created through social interactions. This process entails the 
collective activity of shaping ideas, meanings and understandings, co-existing among actors 
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2013).  
 
International organizations as ideational constructs   
Barnett and Finnemore explain that states delegate critical assignments to IOs, since they can 
provide fundamental functions (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005). Among other things, IOs contribute 
to the collection of information and to arrange agreements wherein commitments are established. 
They regard IOs as significant actors who are not exclusively under the authority of states. 
Rather, IOs are autonomous actors with capacity to exercise power on their own premises and 
influence global issues. IOs achieve their authority from social relations, which grants them their 
autonomy (ibid). 
The principal-agent approach, in which IOs are seen as servants of states, is thus rejected 
(Barnett & Finnemore, 2005). They consider IOs as bureaucracies that function distinctive from 
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states interests, and which are set up to carry out complex tasks. IOs behavior is thus shaped by 
the four central bureaucratic features: hierarchy, continuity, impersonality and expertise (Barnett 
& Finnemore, 2004). Even though these features make bureaucracies the most efficient form of 
organization, dysfunctionalities are an inherent part of these. Dysfunctionalities can both be 
ascribed to material or cultural forces located either inside or outside the organization. Behavior 
will however never be dysfunctional in itself, as it will usually benefit someone. It can thus only 
be characterized as dysfunctional for something or somebody (ibid). 
The authority of IOs, consists in creating interests for actors and defining shared tasks and 
categories. Authority is a social construction and does not exist independently of the social 
relations that constitute and legitimate it (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). It requires consent from 
others and gives power to actors by conferring legitimacy to their opinions. IOs often seek 
authority by presenting themselves as impersonal and neutral actors serving others. They are 
however not neutral since they serve a social purpose and cultural values, which in essence 
makes them authoritative. IOs therefore use discursive and institutional resources to get consent 
from other actors. IOs enjoy delegated, moral and expert authority (Barnett & Finnemore, 
2004:21). With this important role of functions, IOs contribute to constructing the reality of 
world politics, while constructing the social world as well (ibid.). 
 
In the article International Organizations as Policy Actors, Béland and Orenstein adopt an 
ideational approach to the understanding of IOs structure and behavior. They perceive IOs as 
open systems with shifting ideas and interests. Thus, they do not hold fixed preferences of 
politics and “tend to navigate a route between complex and shifting ideas and interests, rather 
than adhere to a consistent, single path” (Béland & Orenstein, 2013:126). Ideas are identified as 
the main factor to shape the meanings that underpin political action and the principles and goals 
of organizations (Béland & Orenstein, 2013:127). The flux of ideas shift according to expert 
knowledge. IOs thus function as both an instrument of implementing policy of powerful actors, 
and a sphere where the content of a specific policy is contested (Béland & Orenstein, 2013).  
IOs interests are not only shaped by changing circumstances, but by a changing interpretation of 
circumstances (Béland & Orenstein, 2013). Since IOs lack formal power these ideational 
processes are the most powerful means through which they can influence policies (ibid.). Their 
flexibility and ability to adapt is thus what sustains their expert legitimacy (ibid.). The source of 
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ideas derives from individual policy entrepreneurs and not from governments, which grants them 
their expert legitimacy. The expert legitimacy of IOs is recognized since updated policy advices 
are in demand (ibid). 
 
Transnational civil society as policy actors  
Theories of global civil society rest on the belief that an increasing number of issues are global 
and thus require transnational solutions (Edwards, 2014:105). Civil society is commonly referred 
to as associational life, as the public sphere of contestation, or as a metaphor for the “good” 
society (Edwards, 2014). It is however necessary to link these dimensions in order to understand 
the full complexity of citizen engagement in public affairs. 
 
Keck and Sikkink emphasize the structuring functions of transnational civil society movements 
by referring to them as transnational advocacy networks. They combine Edwards’ three 
dimensions of civil society in their outline of the political spaces in which actors negotiate 
meanings, ideas and values motivating their joint association. Domestic civil society actors 
engage in transnational networks to amplify the voices to which governments are deaf by allying 
with actors outside domestic states around particular issues. Transnational civil society has been 
criticized for lacking accountability and representation, as the strongest voices tend to be the 
ones to be heard. The virtue in civil society however lies in adding its voices to the public debate. 
They thus contribute with their voices and not with their votes (Edwards, 2014). Transnational 
networks bring new ideas, norms and discourses into policy debates. Among other things these 
networks are characterized by “the centrality of values or principled ideas” and “the belief that 
individuals can make a difference” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:2). 
Despite their lack of formal power, they are able to persuade and pressure powerful 
organizations and governments by transforming the terms of the political debate. They use the 
power of their information, ideas and strategies to influence the information and contexts states 
refer to in the process of policymaking. By promoting the implementation of certain norms, these 
networks “contribute to changing perceptions that both state and societal actors may have of 
their identities, interests and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions and 
ultimately to changing procedures policies and behavior” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:3). Through 
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their interactions, individuals and groups might influence the interests and identities of groups 
and states elsewhere, through a combination of persuasion and socialization (Keck and Sikkink, 
1998:214). They do this effectively by framing “issues in ways that make them fit into particular 
institutional venues and that make them resonate with broader publics, use information and 
symbols to reinforce their claims, identify appropriate targets, and try to make institutions 
accountable in their practices to the norms they claim to uphold” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:201). 
 
Analysis  
The UN drug control system 
The UN drug control system is based on three conventions. The Single Convention of 1961 - 
which unified the conventions pre-dating the UN system into one, and limits the production, 
supply and use of drugs to medical and scientific purposes, the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances of 1971 - which added a range of synthetic drugs to the legislation, and the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 
1988 - which provided measures against drug related crime and trafficking (McAllister, 2000). 
The system is furthermore comprised by several bodies. The highest ranged of these is the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) mandated by the three drug conventions (‘the 
Conventions’ in the following) to consider all issues related to the objectives of these. The CND 
gives policy guidance and monitors the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC). The UNODC is responsible for assisting Member States (‘MS’ in the 
following) in their efforts against illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. Its work comprises research 
and analytical work, field-based technical cooperation and normative work to advocate 
implementation of UN treaties. Lastly the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which 
was established by the 1961 Convention, a quasi-judicial body with the function of monitoring 
the implementation of the Conventions. 
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A world free of drugs 
Ideas are central for actors to shape the meanings that establish their interests and purposes 
(Béland & Orenstein, 2013). These evolve within organizations through a constantly changing 
interpretation of material conditions. Since IOs lack formal power, these ideational processes are 
the strongest ways in which they can influence policies (Ibid). The UN thus impacts domestic 
policies through persuasion by ideas and expertise.  
In the Political Declaration, adopted at the High-level segment of the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs in March 2009 (‘PD’ in the following), a range of concerns regarding the drug issue are 
proclaimed. The MS declare their determination to promote a society free of drugs as the 
ultimate goal of their joint efforts (UNODC, 2009:8). Reducing the drug demand and supply is 
thus recognized as a central factor to fulfilling this goal. One of the biggest concerns is therefore 
the continuous large illicit drug market, which threatens the security, health and welfare of the 
population. It is reasoned, that due to the severe consequences of drug abuse for individuals and 
society, efforts should be centered on demand and supply reducing efforts. Nevertheless, the 
drug control efforts have unintentionally resulted in a large criminal drug market with increasing 
links to corruption and organized crime. This makes it possible for drug cartels to buy their way 
into powerful positions within and across borders, posing a threat to elements such as security 
and development. Year 2019 is established as the target date to eliminate the illicit cultivation, 
demand, production, manufacture, marketing, distribution and trafficking of narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances (UNODC, 2009:14). 
Through this reasoning, the UNODC frames the international drug issue to be one of demand 
(drug abuse) and supply (criminal markets). MS are therefore encouraged to implement measures 
to reduce these. The common goal of eliminating drug markets entirely, which traces back to the 
first UNGASS in 1998 with the slogan “a drug free world - we can do it” (Collins, 2012), implies 
the assumption that this is possible to achieve. At the same time large illicit markets are seen as a 
consequence of drug control measures. As explained by the Executive Director of the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, “the world is afflicted with drug 
addiction (the disease), and the drug control system (the cure) has had a dramatic side effect (a 
huge criminal market)” (UNODC, 2009:3). According to him, the way out of this is designing 
drug control measures that address all aspects of supply, promote law enforcement in vulnerable 
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areas through socio-economic measures, and adopt legal instruments provided by the UN 
(UNODC, 2009:4).  
The PD clarifies that the UN and its MS must take a shared responsibility. Since it is a 
continuously common problem, there is a need to “[...] tackle those global challenges [...] in 
accordance with principles of a common and shared responsibility” (UNODC, 2009:10). By 
framing the problem in this sense of collectivity, the UNODC seeks to create interests for actors 
- in this case, for MS, to cooperate internationally on the issue of drugs as well as implementing 
the legal instruments provided for this purpose by the UN. It is reiterated that the implementation 
of legal instruments created by the UN would ease the struggle with criminal markets. Through 
this, MS are encouraged to believe, it is in their best interest to cooperate with and confer 
authority to the UN drug agencies. This is a central feature to IOs, as they tend to frame 
problems and solutions in ways that legitimate or require their expanded action (Barnett & 
Finnemore, 2004:43). 
In order to reach a solution to these problems diagnosticated above, the Plan of Action (‘POA’ in 
the following), is set out for member states to adopt. The POA is constituted by three parts 
addressing respectively measures of demand reduction, supply reduction, judicial cooperation 
and countering money-laundry. All actions that member states are encouraged to adopt suggest 
the strengthening of UN treaties and agencies. Not only does this, again, reinforce its legitimacy, 
it is also reflects the way in which the UNODC regards itself as an actor. It therefore promotes 
the cooperation with multilateral agencies (of which, the UN is the most important) since it 
regards itself vital in the development of an effective and objective drug control system. Here, 
emphasis is put on its legitimacy as an ‘impartial’ actor able to focus on moral concerns and 
refrain from ideology. Meaning that it depersonalizes decision-making. IOs will often seek 
legitimization by pointing themselves out as objective actors (Béland & Orenstein, 2013). This is 
in part in order to underpin their moral authority as servants to a widely shared of moral 
principles. The UNODC thus identifies itself as a key actor in assisting domestic governments 
with relevant expertise and legal frameworks, which these do not have the resources to develop 
themselves. IOs also function as spheres in which expertise is debated and meaning negotiated 
(Béland & Orenstein, 2013). It is therefore stated that member states should: 
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“[p]rovide the United Nations entities having pertinent expertise with resources for the 
collection of data and the provision of technical and financial assistance to States with a view to 
enhancing their ability to address trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; 
coordination with and among United Nations entities and various multilateral entities should be 
strengthened;”(UNODC, 2009:29) 
The last phrase referring to the coordination among UN entities refers to the bureaucratic 
compartmentalization which is challenged in cases where bureaucracies are given huge complex 
tasks (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004), like that of the drug market. It challenges the boxes and 
divisions in which international bureaucracies try to categorize the world (Barnett & Finnemore, 
2004). This is reaffirmed by Antonio Costa with the stated failure of the compartmentalization 
through which drug control measures have been designed (UNODC, 2009:3). 
Compartmentalization is the central constitutive feature in which modern bureaucracies divide 
labor and allow for specialization (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). This is part of what grants 
bureaucracies their efficiency over other systems of organization (ibid.). It is however 
simultaneously a virtue and a vice, as specialization can limit the field of vision of 
compartments. These might develop as subcultures with distinct cognitive frameworks and 
different interests (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:39). 
The UN system is a bureaucracy and its behavior is therefore shaped by the four central features: 
hierarchy, continuity, impersonality and expertise (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). Bureaucracies 
promote expertise in different ways; one is the division of labor in which officials are allocated 
to acquire specialized expertise, and become trained for their functions (Barnett & Finnemore, 
2004:18). The UNODC emphasizes this in its pillar work programmes, which are expertise-
orientated, one is defined as following; “field-based technical cooperation to counteract illicit 
drugs, crime and terrorism” (UNODC, 2014). As the office is legitimized by its expertise, it 
commits itself to present specialized knowledge. The UNODC argues to do this in POA, as its 
approach is based on scientific evidence and measures (UNODC, 2009:11). Moreover the last 
pillar explains the aim to impact policy decisions; “Research and analytical work to increase 
knowledge and understandings of drugs and crime issues and expand the evidence base for 
policy and operational decisions” (UNODC, 2014). Expertise shape the ways in which IOs will 
behave in regards to important matters, along with creating an authoritative feature (Barnett & 
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Finnemore, 2005). By emphasizing its expertise, the UNODC seeks to underpin its expert 
authority in order to encourage states to grant their consent.  
 
Policy Watchdogs 
The construction of frames is an essential strategy of advocacy networks. By creating and 
framing issues, networks can influence the interests and self-identities of other actors (Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998). “An effective frame must show that a given state of affairs is neither natural nor 
accidental, identify the responsible party or parties, and propose credible solutions” (Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998:19). 
In their Drug Policy Guide (‘the Guide’ in the following) the International Drug Policy 
Consortium (IDPC) presents a diagnostication of the problems associated with the production, 
supply and consumption of drugs, which the IDPC regards as one of the most important issues 
facing the world currently (IDPC, 2014). In the Guide a range of facts, events and cases are used 
to argue for the failure of the current drug control system. In their line of arguments they adopt 
what Keck and Sikkink (1998) dubbed information politics. Advocacy networks interpret facts to 
frame issues in terms of right and wrong to persuade people and stimulate them to act (Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998). A central technique of information politics is the use of language that dramatizes 
the network’s concerns (ibid.). This is seen throughout the Guide, for example with the use of the 
term ‘war on drugs' as a reference to the current drug control system, even though the term stems 
from the repressive ‘zero-tolerance’ drug control measures introduced in the United States by 
President Nixon. This rhetorical technique is used in the Guide to promote certain feelings of the 
reader in relation to prevailing drug policies. The use of value-loaded terminology sustains a 
kind of binary opposition, reinforced throughout the report in relation to prevalent drug policies 
on one side and alternative policies on the other. 
Throughout the Guide, the IDPC advocate the universality and interdependency of human rights. 
Under the headline “Violations of human rights in the name of drug control” (IDPC, 2012:5) a 
list of certain human rights, that MS of the UN are obliged to protect, are presented together with 
the ways in which these are violated as a consequence of drug policies. The responsible to these 
violations are thus domestic governments that due to badly designed drug policies neglect 
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international obligations. Through this exposal they seek moral leverage over governments. This 
works by jeopardizing a targets credit enough to motivate a change in policy (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998). The human rights supposedly violated through drug policies are: the right to life, the right 
to be free from torture, cruel and inhuman punishment, the right to be free from slavery, the right 
to health, social and economic rights, the right to be free from discrimination, the right to 
privacy, and the right to be protected from illicit drug use (IDPC, 2012:5-6). By insisting on this, 
the targeted reader is thus encouraged to resonate that since these human rights are universal and 
natural, and the drug control system is violating these, the latter must thus be unnatural and 
wrong. 
The IDPC argues that the drug control strategy so far has been centralized around “suppression 
of supply through controls on production and distribution, and suppression of demand through 
punishment and deterrence” (IDPC, 2012:17), which once more builds an understanding of the 
current drug control system around negatively loaded terminology. This claim is however also 
used for accountability politics. This is a method of pressuring policy change by exposing the 
distance between discourse and practice. Parts of UN drug conventions advocating ideals of 
protecting the health and wellbeing of mankind are set in contrast to the functioning model, 
which in practice has been based on the principle of deterrence. The objective of this method is 
to create an ‘embarrassing situation’, which should lead the actor to close this distance  (Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998) – in this case, reform the functioning drug control system for it to live up to the 
ideals promoted in the Conventions. The dysfunctionalities of the UN are furthermore exposed, 
as the drug control bodies have advocated a strategy that does not comply with ideals and 
recommendations promoted by its other bodies. 
Since the primary concern of the Conventions is “improving the health and welfare of mankind” 
(IDPC, 2012:19), the wrongly designed system is nothing more than a misinterpretation of these. 
The Guide therefore presents an interpretation of the Conventions, which does not hamper a 
reform of the drug control system. 
The reform advocated by the IDPC is focused on the decriminalization of drug possession and 
the treatment rather than punishment of drug-addicts. Furthermore a regulated drug market is 
suggested as a viable alternative. The central claim is that drug policies should focus on high-
level drug traffickers in order to make dealing networks less violent, less public and less harmful 
  16 
to communities (IDPC, 2012:23). In this claim rests the assumption that dealing networks will 
always exist to some degree and that it is therefore impossible to diminish and control the drug 
market entirely. Due to this assumption, the measures of policy success – “the numbers of drug 
seizures, the numbers of traffickers and users arrested, and the severity of punishments” (IDPC, 
2012:9), have been wrong. Instead this should be measured with “indicators of actual harm, such 
as levels of violent crime and corruption associated with drug trafficking, social and economic 
development indicators for communities in drug-growing areas, and improvements in health and 
social-economic welfare in consumer markets.”(IDPC, 2012:10). 
The real drivers of drug dependence, it is explained, are social inequalities and poverty. Drug 
dependence is usually concentrated among marginalized groups and drug policies further 
stigmatize and exclude these. A solution to this problem is the inclusion of civil society in the 
formulation of drug policies (IDPC, 2014). Civil society networks are thus representative of 
these marginalized and vulnerable groups. This legitimizes their existence and influence in drug 
policy decisions.  
Domestic civil society groups ally and become part of transnational networks on issues ignored 
by domestic governments (ibid.). On an international scale, large transnational advocacy 
networks however tend to have a problem of legitimacy. The IDPC legitimizes its action by its 
wide membership. This way advocacy networks broaden their legitimacy and save on resources, 
as partners provide them with information and data from their regions and help to mobilize and 
disseminate information (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). This reflects their self-identity as policy 
watchdogs protecting citizens against governmentally occasioned harm. They seek to assist 
policy makers in the development of effective drug policies. Advocacy networks seek influence 
by the use of various techniques, including information politics, leverage politics and 
accountability politics (ibid.)  
Essentially goal of the IDPC is to assure the global implementation of progressive drug policies 
(IDPC, 2014). Domestic drug policies are however under strong influence of the UN drug 
control system in which changes depend on consensus agreements. System changes are thus 
restrained by disagreements among member states. The IDPC explains that drug policies have 
therefore been controlled on a basis of ideology rather than facts (IDPC, 2012). One of its self-
proclaimed goals is therefore to provide evidence-based expertise to governments and UN 
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agencies (IDPC, 2014). The IDPC therefore seeks partnerships and collaboration with states that 
have a propensity to question the current regime, as these are easier targets to influence. By 
influencing just one actor, new voices are added to the policy debate and the possibility of more 
states questioning the governing discourse increases. Therefore their short-term objectives are 
influencing chosen key-countries in order to reforming the entire UN drug control system 
eventually (ibid.). Part of their long-term goal is thus to gain economic leverage over states by 
making them reprioritize their expenditures and make these focus on health and harm-reducing 
measures rather than criminal proceedings and repressive measures. 
 
Conflicting realities 
IOs are ideational constructs that influence domestic policies through discursive and agenda 
setting functions (Béland & Orenstein, 2013). Transnational advocacy networks are also centered 
on ideas and influence policy debates by introducing new ideas and discourses (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998). The way both actors frame the drug issue thus reflects their self-understanding and 
ideational justification of their existence. While the UNODC emphasizes the large transnational 
criminal markets, and the need to address these multilaterally, the IDPC draws attention to local 
harm reducing measures. This is related to their self-understood legitimacy and role as actors. 
For the case of the UNODC, it justifies its authority as an expert being able to provide MS with 
neutral and specialized knowledge about effective drug control measures as well as provide the 
framework for international cooperation. The UNODC thus seeks legitimacy through recognition 
from MS. The IDPC in contrasts justifies its existence and advocate its influence as being the 
representative of the civil population affected by the ‘actual harm’ of the drug problem. It seeks 
legitimacy through moral principles, as an actor protecting vulnerable groups and representing 
the interests of citizens. When the IDPC criticizes the measures and policies advocated by the 
UNODC, it thus reflects it’s sought to legitimize their further influence. 
 
The UN is in essence a bureaucracy, a “collection of rules that define complex social tasks and 
establish a division of labor to accomplish them” (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:18) and is 
therefore prone to dysfunctional behavior. Antonio Costa acknowledges this when he refers to 
the problem of a lacking coherence in between drug control measures of different UN 
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departments (UNODC, 2009:3-4). IDPC emphasize this dysfunctionality when it criticizes the 
UN drug control agencies for not acting in accordance with recommendations of other UN 
bodies as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the High Commissioner of Human Rights 
(HCHR). The crystallization of the drug control system around dysfunctional modes of thinking 
and failed policies (Collins, 2012) can lead one to doubt the impartiality and authority of the 
UNODC. No behavior is however dysfunctional in itself as it will usually serve something or 
somebody (Barnett & Finnemore). The behavior of the UNODC can thus only be dysfunctional 
for something else. The IDPC thus emphasizes the dysfunctionality of drug control behavior for 
the Human Rights ideals, as a way to gain influence through the use of accountability politics.  
 
Another dysfunctionality pointed out by the IDPC is regarding the bureaucratic set-up of the UN 
drug control system. The UN General Assembly has generally been criticized for being over-
representative and working as a propaganda arena rather than a policy-making organ (Heywood, 
2014). Since it represents all MS equally, all decisions rely on consensus agreements. The 
system developed upon the two fundamental beliefs; “that the best way to reduce problems 
caused by illicit drug use is to minimize the scale of the illicit drug market; and that this can be 
achieved through a reliance on prohibition-oriented supply-side measures” (Bewley-Taylor, 
2012:49). Even though it is widely accepted that the prohibitionist drug regime has worsened the 
global drug problems, the system continues to pursue this same approach (Spillane, 2000). The 
IDPC points out, that even though many member states, and the UN to a certain degree, are 
aware of the ineffectiveness of the drug control system, reform is impeded by reliance on 
consensus agreements (IDPC, 2012). This dysfunctionality is thus “attributable to bureaucratic 
culture and internal bureaucratic processes and that lead the IO to act in a manner that subverts 
its self-professed goals” (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:8). 
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Conclusion 
The international drug control system is comprised by several UN bodies, which seek to 
influence drug policies by persuasion of ideas and expertise, since they lack formal power. This 
is to a large extent carried out through the framing of the drug issue. The UNODC frames the 
main issue of drugs to be the large illicit drug market. It advocates this to be addressed by 
measures seeking to reduce demand and supply of drugs. The drug issue is furthermore 
emphasized to be a shared problem that requires international cooperation. In regards to this, the 
UNODC points towards the framework provided by the UN as a facilitator of this cooperation. 
Through this it seeks to legitimize its influence. MS are thus urged to believe it to be in their own 
interests to cooperate with UN drug agencies and implement its instruments. Furthermore they 
pose the assumption that a drug-free world is possible, if it is countered with evidence-based 
knowledge. Again, the UN bodies are pointed out as the appropriate actors to develop this, due to 
its ability to stand outside ideology and operate objectively (UNODC, 2009). Through this the 
UNODC seeks to emphasize its expert authority and persuade MS to comply with its 
recommendations. Its expertise stems in part from its compartmental structure, which is an 
inherent feature of bureaucracies (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). The bureaucratic nature of the 
UN however also implies dysfunctional behavior.  
These dysfunctions are pointed out by the IDPC as a method of influencing the drug policy 
debate. Even though its main goal is to gain moral and economic leverage over domestic 
governments, it targets the UN drug control system in order to influence the nature of the policy 
debate. Advocacy networks construct frames to influence interests of other actors. The IDPC 
frame the drug issue by the use of information and symbolic language to wake disapproval of the 
current state of affairs. By advocating human rights they take advantage of a morally accepted 
norm to promote the distance between discourse and practice of domestic and international 
politics. In difference from the UNODC, the IDPC frames the issue with the assumption that a 
complete eradication of drugs in society would be impossible. It is therefore reasoned that the 
focus should be put on harm reduction rather than the criminal market. The IDPC is thus more 
concerned with making drug policies comply with and protect human rights rather than 
diminishing the illicit drug abuse and production. Through this the IDPC seeks legitimacy as the 
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representatives of citizens and the protectors of the vulnerable. By gaining this recognition, UN 
drug agencies will regard it beneficial to include the IDPC in the policy debate, in order to live 
up to its moral authority. The way both actors frame the drug issue therefore reflects their 
inherent ideas and self-identities as actors, which are reinforced through the frameworks they 
create. 
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